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ABSTRACT 
Dualism and the resulting economic upturn played a key role in the history of the 
development of Hungarian statehood, including budgetary and monetary mat-
ters. In his work entitled “East of Europe, West of Asia – Historical development of 
Hungarian public finances from the age of dualism to the present”, Csaba Lentner 
presents the over one-and-a-half-decade-long period after the Austro-Hungarian 
Compromise of 1867 during which the financial administration of Hungary, in-
cluding the country’s monetary policy, became completely developed. The author 
highlights the events on two timelines: on the one hand, as a process, on the other 
hand, highlighting main periods in themselves. In this manner, the reader’s at-
tention is closely “tied” to the book, as the author undertakes to interpret rela-
tions which evolved in the past and are interrelated. The proof-reader of the book 
joins in with his ideas in a discursive manner.
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1 FOUNDATION IN THE HISTORY OF THEORY
The latest book by Csaba Lentner provides a broad overview of the period from 
the establishment of domestic public finances, through development full of dif-
ficulties, to the present. A detailed presentation of the past is new for many of us, 
1 Lentner, Csaba (2019): Az állampénzügyek fejlődéstörténete Magyarországon a dualizmustól 
napjainkig – Kelettől Nyugatra, Nyugattól Keletre [East of Europe, West of Asia – Evolution of 
Public Finances in Hungary, from the Age of Dualism to the Present Day]. Budapest: L’Harmattan 
Publisher, 280 p. ISBN: 9789634145103.
2 Ernő Huszti, Honorary University Professor, Doctor of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. E-
mail: husztierno@t-online.hu.
ECOnOMY AnD FInAnCE • VOL. 7. ISS. 1 • MARCH 2020 • DOI: 10.33908/EF.2020.1.5
ERnő HuSzTI102
as, unlike historians, we study the present instead of the past. However, the author 
points out in detail that, despite its “dormant state” due to the early foundation of 
the state and the permanently primitive conditions, Hungarian monetary history 
was very edifying. Moreover, it was sometimes, for example, in the times of King 
Matthias, very successful even in European comparison. As it is indicated by de-
tails later, the history of Hungarian finances was rather characterised by hard 
periods than by successful ones for a long time. That is why providing a detailed 
and objective overview of Hungarian finances over the past decades is so impor-
tant. What I mean by that is the objective analysis of the two financial subsystems 
(fiscal and monetary policies), the development of their relationship and the ways 
as well as the mode of action of their practical implementation. 
I have to note that although the author is clearly committed to fiscal theories and 
practice and considers monetary relations to be important, I rather believe in the 
cooperation of the two financial subsystems, fiscal and monetary polices of equal 
rank. Obviously, my comments reveal my point of view. At the same time, I think 
that the increasing role of the state in economic policy and the appreciation of the 
relevant public finances are inevitable. As the central bank is not only the “bank 
of banks”, but it is also the “bank of the state”. As such, it manages government 
revenues and expenditures and provides loans for the budget directly or indirect-
ly. In view of my previous statements, it can be said that in the early 2000s, “The 
dependence of central banks on the government was different, irrespective of the 
way of its declaration. (...) the central banks supervising the banks always try to 
implement the economic policy decisions of governments in practice, subordinat-
ing their activity to the governments. (...) In this way, more and more countries 
use the tools of monetary regulation, as it allows relatively flexible application and 
does not require parliamentary authorisations. Based on the above, government 
decisions get into the scope of and are implemented by the central banks, which 
are independent to varying degrees, in different countries.” (Huszti, 2001-2002:55) 
It should be noted that those who support the principle of the central bank’s in-
dependence believe that in the absence of democratic authorisation by the voters, 
central banks are allowed to take only technocratic decisions instead of political 
decisions which have to be taken by elected politicians authorised by the parlia-
ment. It is true even nowadays that the debate of the representatives of the fiscal 
and monetary policies have largely contributed to the development of the appro-
priate role of financial policy, including the roles of the budget and the central 
bank, as their exaggerated statements and mutual criticism drew attention to the 
weakest points. Consequently, in principle, well-balanced financial policy can 
ward off the exaggerations of such theories. However, based on experience, either 
one or the other theory becomes temporarily prevailing in the developed coun-
tries, depending on what economic policy tasks are prioritised (Huszti, 1998).
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In my view, the aforementioned practice causes several difficulties if lending to 
the budget is of “coercive nature” for the central bank. As in this case, mutatis 
mutandis, the crowding out effect applies, which means that the volume of loans 
that can be provided to the other sectors of the economy is decreasing. Although 
central banks “officially” publish the opposite, in general, they do not rigidly re-
fuse to provide loans for the budget within reasonable limits and fulfil govern-
ment expectations. However, we must warn the government of possible dangers 
as well as the compensatory measures required. In this way, the preliminary mon-
etary assessment of major budgetary decisions becomes especially important. As 
Lentner wrote: “Central banks do not strive to supersede, prevent anything or 
implement their own “narrow-hearted” approach at any price. It is all about sup-
porting the relevant field in a special way. Moreover, central banks feel that it is 
their essential commitment to do so.”3 On the other hand, central banks have to 
prove their position convincingly and provide a right solution at the same time.
Applying the general rules of international monetary policy to the activity of the 
domestic central bank is as wrong as considering domestic practice to be some-
thing that other international central banks should take over. Convergence is ob-
vious, but each country has to “work hard” for the monetary and fiscal policies 
which most appropriately fulfil its own criteria and can be regarded as successful. 
At the same time, the global development of modern monetary theories and the 
variation possibilities of the adequate new applications have to be followed. The 
central bank shall follow the more and more widespread discretional budgetary 
practice as direct state intervention, in the framework of which the budget takes 
over the financing of national economic, scientific, technical, etc. risks which 
market participants are already unable to finance.4 Such risks have substantial 
impact on the price system and thus on monetary balance.
In my opinion, in the light of the above-mentioned circumstances, the conditions 
and frameworks of lending by the central bank have to be more strictly treated. 
As it is known, the payment account of the budget (government budget account) 
is managed by the National Bank of Hungary. By its nature, revenues arrive pe-
riodically (usually quarterly, in the form of taxes), while expenditures are due al-
most on a daily basis. Consequently, the central bank tries to overcome the deficit 
on the payment account of the budget by lending, which does not comply with 
the law on the central bank. The non-payment of the current budgetary expendi-
3 Op. cit. p. 56.
4 According to professional literature, public work, unemployment benefit, corporate tax, progres-
sive income tax, etc. are discretional budgetary instruments. The parliament or the government 
regulates them on the basis of economic cycles (see Huszti, 1998).
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tures would lead to serious economic difficulties, therefore the negative balance of 
the payment account of the budget is regulated by the law. The National Bank of 
Hungary shall take into account or shall not even exceed this rate of balance.5 Of 
course, it sometimes results in late budgetary payments, so that charges of covert 
deficit financing can be avoided.
In the light of the above, there is increased interest in and more attention is paid 
to financial issues and connections. In the daily press, we can meet terms such 
as fiscal and monetary policy, financial balance, interest rates, investments, ex-
change rates, securities, etc. and so on, though they are not always used correctly 
in a professional sense. Moreover, terms of monetary theory also appear in eve-
ryday conversations, which also indicates the spread of financial literacy. Why 
have these terms become part of the ordinary language? The answer is simple: 
because financial literacy has evolved in public life and money owners meet these 
unknown financial phenomena affecting their person and business on a daily ba-
sis. Currently, perhaps the most direct and personal of such phenomena is the 
gradual accumulation of a large amount of cash by money owners, mainly the 
general public, who seek to preserve the value of their money, receive appropri-
ate yield and look for security. In order to achieve these goals, they rely directly 
or indirectly on the support provided by professionals and financial institutions.
One of the actual problems our experts are dealing with is by what means the 
huge amount of cash kept in the “pillowcase” by the general public could be suc-
cessfully involved in the financing system. First, we should decide in which phase 
of the economic cycle we are in. It seems to me that complicated and often unclear 
fiscal methods (e.g. issuing long-term Treasury bonds) reach only those money 
owners who are able to invest large amounts, but fail to reach people with me-
dium or smaller savings. But certain “pitfalls” are still recognizable. The two most 
important pitfalls are the limitation of the amount for which the bond can be 
redeemed prior to maturity as well as the clearing of its exchange rate, i.e. at what 
price the bonds is bought back before the maturity date. In my view, it is already 
clear which goals cannot be achieved, however, the solution has not been found 
yet. I am afraid that it will enforce the observable increase of the central bank’s 
current prime rate and that of deposit rates offered by commercial banks.
5 Pulay, Gyula – Simon, József – Szilas, István (2017): A költségvetési maradvány mint költ-
ségvetési kockázat [Remaining Budgetary Balance as a Budgetary Risk]. Pénzügyi Szemle, 2017/4, 
431-444.
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2 ABOUT “OPTIMAL” ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL POLICY
The aforementioned ideas lead to the correlations between the development and 
relationship of optimal economic and fiscal policies. The available natural and 
monetary resources, as well as the amount of external financial resources are 
given even for the wealthiest countries, determining the economic and financial 
policies they have to develop. 
As economic policy is part of applied economics, the country has to know past 
processes accurately so as to be able to create a vision. Consequently, in different 
historic periods different economic and social expectations had to be fulfilled, 
based on the decision of the country’s own government, a market-oriented deci-
sion or under pressure. In the light of the above, the main question is how “op-
timal economic policy” can be developed, what its characteristics are and what 
proves its correctness and usefulness. Is there any general recipe at all? Or does 
each country have to work hard for its implementation and efficiency? Or should 
the countries accept the relevant classifications applied by economists? To what 
extent can the unique solutions of individual countries, which from the general 
approach be accepted or rejected? 
As seen above, we should find the answers to several important questions. Such 
answers are influenced not only by the views of researchers, but also by the sub-
ject, time and economic “embeddedness” of the research. What are the criteria of 
“optimal economic policy” at all? Are they long-lasting or do they change from 
period to period? What are the consequences of external effects? 
As I mentioned earlier, “Financial experts tend to be proud of being practical 
rather than theoretical people. Yet a lot of statements of historically established 
monetary theories are - usually unintentionally and rather spontaneously - re-
flected in their actions, views and decisions. (...) Certain statements of monetary 
theories become part of practice almost imperceptibly...” “At other times, theo-
retical truths are proven by practical experience “without any intriguing” and 
there is no need for drawing forced parallels” (Huszti, 2001–2002).
Earlier research principally covered the analysis of the government’s budgetary 
activity. Later, finance dealt with all activities related to internal revenue. In my 
view, “finance is a complex science that covers the theoretical and practical rela-
tionship between economic and financial policies, all financial activities of the 
state, the operation of the monetary system (banks, insurance companies and 
other financial activities, etc.), i.e. the connections between the two subsystems 
of financial policy (fiscal and monetary), the conditions for the functioning of the 
money and capital markets, the finances of companies, enterprises and business 
entities, the activities of other economic operators, as well as the generation and 
use (e.g. for investments. etc.) of income and accumulations” (Huszti, 1998).
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Within the huge system of finance, macro- and micro-level analyses have gradu-
ally evolved ad have almost become independent, prioritising their own charac-
teristics. As a result, theory and practice have necessarily become independent, 
of course, in accord with each other. Theory should not dispense with chang-
ing practical requirements, while practice should not reject new theoretical ap-
proaches. Of course, it does not mean that different schools did not or could not 
form their own opinion. However, it only lends colour to prevailing theories and 
practical solutions. All this is well reflected by the stricter, deeper and more func-
tional character of the views on tax policy:
 − Based on Adam Smith’s recommendation, four principles should be considered 
when developing the appropriate tax policy: clarity, cheap collectability, easy 
affordability and fairness.
 − At the same time, alluding to obviously unfair practices, István Széchenyi 
wrote the following: “As far as possible, everyone should bear the burdens of 
the country fairly and proportionally, but should enjoy the benefits arising 
from it in the same proportions.”
 − According to István Hetényi, it can also be considered to be the criticism of the 
economic system: the tax system
a) should be equitable (fair), should not distort the optimal allocation of 
production factors evolving in an efficient market;
b) should be flexible, should stabilise short-term economic policy;
c) should be clear and guarantee equal treatment;
d) taxes should be cheaply collectable and fair (Hetényi, 1996).
 − As far as the definition of the most modern domestic principles is concerned, 
Csaba Lentner believes that proposals about solving actual problems related 
to the tax exemption of subsistence level income, the unviability of business 
associations and the rules of limitation are arguable (Lentner, 2017).
In order to implement fiscal policy, “interoperability” between the budget and 
the central bank is a natural demand and an unavoidable practice. In the light 
of the above, it is a matter of course that central banks try to solve certain mon-
etary problems by using budgetary instruments and vice versa. For example, it 
is enough to mention one of the main problems of the central bank: the huge 
volume of cash accumulated by the citizens. As the central bank insists on the 
current base rate, the budget is trying to decrease the volume of cash by issu-
ing government securities promising higher interest rates. However, the banking 
system “quietly, but more and more frequently” warned about the dangers and 
consequences of the covert and untraceable financing of budgetary deficit by the 
central bank.
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The early, conservative fiscal theories intended to cover the deficit by increasing 
taxes and rejecting borrowing, while fiscal theories evolving around the turn of 
the millennium accepted that the deficit was covered from loans borrowed from 
the central bank. At the same time, according to such fiscal theories, the possible 
unfavourable effects of this practice on taxes, income distribution and internal 
savings were troubling. They wanted the implementation of this practice to be 
subject to parliamentary authorisation, though there were not any doubts about 
its approval.6 Of course, the representatives of these theories were aware of the 
fact that this practice was equal to non-central bank currency issue, to which no 
macro-level requirements apply. The central banks’ response included the strict 
observance of loan maturities, refusal of extension and providing a legal frame-
work for prepayment.
It can be established that an increasing proportion of the financing of budgetary 
deficit is covered by indirect and non-central bank methods. The advantage of this 
is that the outstanding money supply in the national economy is not increased, 
but redistributed instead. The budget owes other money holder groups (citizens, 
financial institutions, companies, etc.), which also brings about a kind of income 
redistribution and influences the change of budgetary deficit. At the same time, 
a special “yield competition” evolves among government bonds, stocks, Treasury 
bills, deposit rates and the securities issued by financial institutions. All this leads 
to further income redistribution, which also increases the “competition for sav-
ings” and strengthens “interest rate expectations”.
The “who defeats whom” competition is affected by the short-term economic 
trend, as well. As it was mentioned earlier, “In the case of recession, when solvent 
loan demand is lower than lending ability, commercial banks may prefer buy-
ing government securities, as it allows the safe allocation of their resources. In 
this way, at least the costs of funds are recovered. (…) However, during economic 
boom, government securities can be purchased only at the expense of satisfying 
their clients’ credit demand. In this case, banks - if they are not forced to buy 
government securities - tend to prefer their clients.” However, if they have to pur-
chase government securities under budgetary pressure, borrowing becomes very 
expensive for the state owing to high interest rates (Huszti, 1998).
6 For example, in France, the government had a revolving credit facility at the central bank at the 
turn of 2000. The government and the governor of the central bank took ad hoc decisions on its 
use. Its used also required parliamentary approval. 
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3  ABOUT THE APPRECIATION OF FISCAL POLICY  
AND ITS HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS
In short, nowadays we can witness the appreciation of financial policy, which 
cannot avoid the coordination of a well-balanced fiscal policy with the policy of 
the central bank. In view of the above, Csaba Lentner is right when he raises sev-
eral important questions, including the following: Where should the economy be 
heading and with what kind of social and economic instruments? To what extent 
can the set of instruments supporting the state’s economic development activ-
ity be considered “ethical”? Where is the role of the state necessary or perhaps 
essential? When does it become unreasonable and oppressive for the economy? 
Where are the limits of centralisation? How far can governments go regarding 
the centralisation of power? 
The questions raised by the author are not only right, but also actual. Unfortu-
nately, we cannot find clear answers to them even in the huge volume of literature 
reviewed. In my opinion, a satisfactory response can be found at the end of Part 
1, in Chapter 7: “... the crisis management methods used in Hungary from 2010 
are justified by the intention according to which centralisation as well as stronger 
state influence and control in the economy are not goals, but “mere” instruments 
in consolidation” (Lentner, 2019a). The financial government should set uniform, 
positive fiscal and monetary “expectations” which economic operators are able to 
accept. However, it depends on “space and time.” As a result of the competition 
for providing more favourable interest rates and yields, the budget can gain ad-
vantage over financial institutions only if its interest rate and yield offers regular-
ly exceed those of financial institutions. In this case, financial institutions make 
lending more expensive due to decreasing resources, which triggers an interest 
rate spiral that provably brings about the loss of clients and markets. The situation 
is further complicated by the fact that all this depends on space and time, and its 
effects are significantly different during recession or boom.
The situation becomes special when the budget starts borrowing from other eco-
nomic operators instead of financial institutions. In this case, the aim is to repay 
the high-interest loans taken out from the central bank or from the banking sys-
tem, but anti-inflationary money phase-out can also be the underlying reason. In 
such cases, the budget is without deficit, therefore its measure is anti-inflationary 
and aims to clean the debt portfolio. As a result, loans for easing corporate liquid-
ity tensions become more expensive. At the same time, the yield of people’s long-
term savings, the aim of which is to achieve persistently high interest rates rather 
than using the capital, increases. 
Prior to the detailed description of the content of the work subject to this study, 
it should be mentioned that the author undertook to present the historical devel-
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opment of domestic public finances in an exceptionally detailed way, based on 
his research encompassing one and a half centuries. He continued and used the 
work of such historical predecessors as István Széchenyi, Ignác Romsics, József 
Kelemen, Gyula Kautz, István Bibó, Dani Rodrik, John M. Keynes, Adam Smith 
etc., adapting it to our current knowledge and practical experience. On the other 
hand, of course, he also relied on domestic publications of our age and from the 
past few decades.
Moving on to providing a review of the content of the work, due to the social 
consequences of the foundation of the state after the Hungarian conquest of the 
Carpathian Basin, relations with the neighbouring countries, the introduction of 
agriculture, the Tartar Invasion, the 150-year-long Turkish occupation and, later, 
the Habsburg Empire, the independent Hungarian financial system could evolve 
only temporarily, therefore in Hungary, feudalism lasted longer than in the west-
ern countries.
I agree with Lentner that, because of the almost continuous wars within the coun-
try and abroad, the real starting date of economic recovery called the “Reform 
Era” is 1820. In this period, the intellectual leaders of the nobility, under the lead-
ership of Széchényi, attempted to explore the real economic state of the coun-
try and find a “modern” solution with their proposals characteristic of the era. 
However, poverty, scarce capital supply, the serfs, the lack of equitable taxation 
and lending placed such a severe burden on the domestic economy that recovery 
from the situation would have required several decades. Based on the problems 
listed above, it was proven that feudalism, including the Law of Entailment as a 
major barrier to development, was not sustainable anymore. Széchenyi raised the 
following questions: Why is the capitalist poorer than he should be based on his 
money? Why the lord poorer than he should be based on his land? According to 
Széchenyi’s reply, because the capitalist cannot invest his capital as he wishes, 
while the landlord cannot sell his land freely. Consequently, their capital and 
lands could not cover credits or loans. Therefore, their only option was to accept 
illegal interest, however, they did not want to do so. In this way, they could not 
take advantage of the best economic opportunities, which significantly contrib-
uted to the underdevelopment of the industry and the agriculture.
As Kelemen states, “Széchenyi was neither liberal, nor conservative. His reform 
ideas made up the intellectual content of the 1830s, but (...) the rising liberal party 
was a great rival.” (Kelemen, 1938:2) From 1840, important laws were adopted, 
inter alia the Act on Bills of Exchange and Corporations, etc., but they did not 
bring about any perceptible change. Their effect on the economy was almost im-
perceptible.
Not only did Széchenyi prepare the war of independence, but he was also a public 
figure when he became the minister of traffic and public works. This was a source 
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of “inner conflict” for him, as he accepted a position that belonged to his intel-
lectual opponents. Despite the fact that he was not a member of the liberal party, 
he agreed to become part of Count Batthyány’s government. 
Széchenyi had to overcome himself when taking a decision on accepting the min-
isterial position offered by his intellectual opponents representing different prin-
ciples. In the end, he thought that the position offered should have priority over 
his personal grievances, hoping to have a chance of realising his ideas in practice.
Lentner reveals that in spite of the fact that 36 relatively important financial 
institutions were opened in Budapest and in the countryside in the 1840s, they 
failed to bring about significant changes, as due to the crisis in Vienna, in 1841, 
the initial reform processes were interrupted. What is more, they contributed to 
strengthening the conservative trends. The new constitution, which was ratified 
by the king on 11 April 1848, was born more than half a decade later, abolishing 
feudalist obligations, i.e. entailment, the privileges of the nobility and customs 
barriers and replacing them by the freedom of pursuing agricultural, industrial 
and commercial activities.
However, due to the historical circumstances in which it was born, the new con-
stitution could not disregard the events of the revolutions in Paris and Vienna. In 
particular, the declaration of equal burden sharing lead to a very new financial 
situation and the opportunity to create a long-desired independent budget. As a 
minister of finance, Kossuth believed that the prerequisite for the desired national 
currency was not only the establishment of a national bank, bust also that of an 
independent ministry of finance. However, the radicalising society strove for po-
litical instead of economic independence. Such efforts manifested themselves in 
armament, the increase of the military force, the independent issue of banknotes, 
as well as the development of the Hungarian budgetary and financial system.
Nevertheless, the war of independence failed owing to the well-know historical 
circumstances and the military superiority of the Monarchy and the Russian Em-
pire. Subsequently, the Monarchy, overrating its own gradual stabilisation, intro-
duced a stricter economic and tax system for offsetting public debt. The system 
was applied in new areas, while taxes were increased in a systematic and differen-
tiated manner. As a result, the taxes levied successor states were higher by 4-8% 
than average taxes in the empire. In addition, in order to reduce increased state 
debt, new and modern tax types were introduced. These taxes were also raised 
year by year, namely, consumption taxes more than income taxes. As Lentner 
neatly notes, the underlying intention of the empire was to make the nobility 
return to the sphere of interest of the Monarchy.
Although the dynamic development of financial institutions that started prior to 
the revolution and war of independence could not be stopped in the process of the 
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modernisation of economic administration, more serious changes took place only 
in the 1860s. The years between the two periods were dominated by high inter-
est rates of 18-20%. “Hungary, without any chance of resistance, was exposed to 
developed Austrian commercial capitalism” (Kelemen, 1938:21).
Interestingly, the industry development policy of the Monarchy preferred the 
Czech and Moravian territories, as they were more “pliable” than the renitent 
Hungarians. The leaders of the Monarchy considered its western territories safer 
and revolution-free, not to mention the character of their economic relations. 
This attitude of the government of the Monarchy did not change even after the 
Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867. As regards the central bank, the situa-
tion was similar. The Austrian Nation Bank was still characterised by austere be-
haviour, limited lending policy and relatively adverse and prejudicially selective 
interest rate policy. As a result, the development of the less developed regions of 
our country was prevented by higher interest rates, as well.
Despite the “urgent action” required based on the international situation (re-
garding his imperial goals, Bismarck did not count on the Monarch), the Austro-
Hungarian Compromise of 1867 was made in the spirit of equality but rather in 
the spirit of a hierarchical relationship “...the huge task of equitably determining 
the mutual rights and obligations of two allied states was far from being solved” 
(Zergényi, 1890:282).
Regular disagreements on determining the financing rate of the costs of joint 
public finances also reflected the previous statement. The Austrians intended to 
take objective decisions on long-term developments, while the Hungarians con-
sidered that the only acceptable way was to break down the development goals by 
object. Finally, as is known, the statutory contribution rate of 30–70% was valid 
for 10 years (by 31 December 1877). Subsequently, neither the rate, nor the time 
interval was compulsory. In the light of the above, an important event of the 
Austro-Hungarian Compromise, the establishment of a joint central bank, the 
Austro-Hungarian Bank, took place in 1878. The new central bank’s two “Main 
Institutes” of equal rank started their operation in Vienna and Budapest, with 
the same rights and obligations (including the monopoly of issuing bank notes).7
Returning to the idea above, after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, do-
mestic developments - the building of the railway, the regulation of the Danube, 
the rebuilding of the capital and the construction of the Port of Fiume were a huge 
burden on the government budget, as these projects were mainly financed from 
loans. On the proposal of Sándor Wekerle, the government attempted to cover the 
7 It should be mentioned that the Budapest Main Institute of the Austro-Hungarian Bank was 
entitled to issue only 20-crown banknotes. 
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budget deficit by raising different taxes and duties, changing the maturity dates of 
government bonds and decreasing their interest rates, etc. (Sándor–Kolossa, 1950). 
In the absence of the required budget revenues, the state had to limit expenditures 
permanently and increase revenues regularly to be able to fulfil its repayment 
obligations arising from increased borrowing. Failing this, the sources of taking 
out new loans would have dried up. In order to prevent this, the investments to 
be implemented and the amount of government loans from which they were to be 
financed were regulated by the law. The State Audit Office of Hungary established 
in 1870 was in change of auditing the aforementioned figures merely in terms of 
accounting.
Similarly to the European trend, in the years after the Austro-Hungarian Com-
promise of 1867, a considerable amount of capital flowed into the country, on the 
one hand, as a result of an increase in the number of new financial institutions, 
on the other hand, due to the construction of railways and the financing of the 
above-mentioned projects. It was in line with demands according to which not 
only agriculture should be developed, but also the development of the industry 
and the infrastructure (industry, navigation, construction of sewage systems, etc.) 
was necessary, based on modern technology of the era. Moreover, they wanted to 
prioritise the establishment of factories which were to start manufacturing new 
products which had not been produced earlier here in our country. These factories 
were even granted tax allowances.8
Based on the above, in line with the spirit of the era, Hungary was continuously 
leaving behind feudal methods of production: “Over the past ten years, Hungary’s 
trade, agriculture and industry in general have been progressing and develop-
ing.” (Baross, 1877:264) As far as the industry was concerned, domestic companies 
were subsidised by making “public supply” compulsory. In spite of this fact, the 
Hungarian industry was lagging behind compared to other members states of the 
Monarchy. According to Endre Nagy, “industrial development was not equally in-
tense during the whole existence of the Monarchy, but it was rather concentrated 
in the period between the late 1890s and the outbreak of the world war. (...) Inci-
dentally, even industry itself adjusted to the dominant role of agriculture in the 
structure of the economy.” (Nagy, 1977:86) In this was, the interests of landowners 
dominated both the economy and public administration. After 1867, economic 
development in the modern sense could have started with the Austro-Hungarian 
Compromise, the establishment of a joint central bank and the introduction of 
the gold standard system.
8 The tax allowance applied to the home industry, craft, ship-building, the acquisition of parts by 
transport companies, etc.
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According to Csaba Lentner, in the period of “quasi-statehood”, which was rela-
tively short even in a historical sense, the desired change could not take place in 
finances. Moreover, the biggest loser of the First World War was Hungary. Al-
though the “Double-Headed Eagle” fell, historic Hungary fell apart and the Káro-
lyi government and the Council Republic committed a series of mistakes in the 
field of finances. The damages of the war affected 85-90 % of the national assets, 
budgetary deficit was extremely high, while inflation was a severe burden on the 
mutilated country. 
Even after the declaration of independence, the Károlyi government received 
significant amounts from the Vienna branch of the Austro-Hungarian Bank. 
Moreover, even the reprint of certain banknotes (25- and 200-crown banknotes) 
in Budapest was allowed. However, only the face of the 200-crown bank notes 
included a design, the back was partly decorated with wavy lines, partly empty. 
The latter notes were called “white money”, while the rest of the notes were called 
“blue money”. People considered “blue money” to be more valuable, expecting 
that it would regain its purchasing power over time. Everyone wanted to sell for 
“blue money” and buy for “white money”. “White money” was considered to be 
the product of inflation. Consequently, the large volume of white money issued 
under the Károlyi government gave further boost to inflation. (Huszti, 1959).
In this situation, the financial government of the Council Republic committed 
another mistake: as opposed to other successor states, they did not overprint the 
banknotes issued by the Monarchy, therefore these banknotes flooded all the re-
maining parts of the country, resulting in hyperinflation of yet unknown scale 
in the world. Although there were several plans on setting up an independent 
central bank, none of them could be implemented owing to a lack of the required 
assets and in a period of only 133 days. Despite the shortness of available time, 
they started the nationalisation of banks and the creation of a new, independent 
currency with incredible determination. As the emission policy was dictated by 
Vienna, the Council Republic wanted to get rid of this dependence. The nationali-
sation of banks and the introduction of a kind of planned economy were regarded 
as urgent issues. 
In spite of directing cash flow to state channels, the establishment of an independ-
ent central bank also became a necessity, as the main institute of the Austro-Hun-
garian Bank in Vienna cut all ties with the main institute in Budapest. Therefore, 
temporarily, the Finance Institute Centre was in charge with fulfilling the role of 
the “quasi central bank”, because its employees’ professional knowledge made it 
the most suitable organisation for this task. Later, then they decided on the issue 
of a new currency, the Postal Savings Bank took over this responsibility.
For lack of the competence and practice required for carrying out the activities 
of a central bank, they tried to solve only current difficulties. Inter alia, as the 
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shortage of change was considerable, first, they issued only small denomination 
banknotes of, later coins. Concurrently, they wanted to gradually withdraw 50-, 
100-, 1000- and 10000-crown denominations, but they could not implement their 
plans due to historical events. Meanwhile, the Treaty of Trianon was concluding, 
ordering the liquation of the Austro-Hungarian Bank, as well. The responsibili-
ties of the central bank were taken over by the Royal Hungarian Note Issuing In-
stitute in Hungary. 
Due to severe post-war economic losses, the difficulties related to the establish-
ment of an independent, stable monetary system, the lack of a Hungarian central 
bank and domestic capital accumulation, isolation in foreign policy, reparation 
obligation and for other reasons, the value (purchasing power) of the national 
currency (crown) could not be preserved again.9 The measures to protect the in-
ternal market, including import ban, a new customs policy, etc., were not effective 
enough. Therefore, the Bethlen government was forced to take drastic steps for 
consolidation. In the framework of this programme, they changed the customs 
policy, lifted the import ban, facilitated the import of missing raw materials, es-
tablished an independent central bank and introduced a new currency, the pengo. 
At the same time, they could not change the conspicuous imbalances of the agri-
cultural sector: 72.5% of people working in agriculture owned a land of 5 cadastral 
acres, while 0.66% of landowners had an estate of more than 100 acres. Tis fact 
alone refers to the underdevelopment of Hungary’s economic structure. Under 
the Bethlen government, the government’s attitude to agriculture did not change 
despite rising inflation. It was mainly attributable to the government’s endeavours 
to prevent the spreading of land purchases by foreign citizens at any price, as there 
had been several examples for such purchases in history. However, agriculture 
had to face a lot of problems, which culminated during the economic crisis of 
1929-33. The Bethlen government proved to be the less efficient exactly in this 
period. The 1929 crash of the New York Stock Exchange primarily hit agriculture, 
which had an especially detrimental effect on our country. Although the Bethlen 
government sought to support smallholders, it was not able to prevent them from 
becoming indebted. Nor were banks and industrial concerns able to avoid the 
ensuing financial and credit crisis that lasted by the end of 1933.
In connection with this period, it should be mentioned that in 1933, exchange con-
trol was introduced and the quasi convertibility of pengo was suspended. The his-
toric significance of the move lies in the fact it was the first time that the convert-
ibility of a currency was suspended in international finance. At the same time, it 
9 “Between 1914 and 1924, prices became 8000 times higher, while wages became just 3500 times 
higher” (Romsics, 2017:87).
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is worth mentioning that pengo was accepted in almost all of the neighbouring 
countries like a convertible currency.
The Royal Hungarian Note Issuing Institute established in 1921 could function as 
a central bank only to a limited extent. For the sake of economic consolidation, 
in 1924, the establishment of the National Bank of Hungary with contemporary 
functions was needed. The functions of the central bank included the protection 
of the stability of the crown, issuing cash, providing appropriate gold cover and 
exchanging banknotes for gold (upon request). The central bank started its op-
eration as a company limited by shares. Exercising its functions, it protected the 
value of the national currency, influenced the cash and credit supply by monetary 
instruments, set the base rate and provided for the gold cover of the volume of 
cash issued (Botos, 1999).
As the exchange rate of the crown was tied to pound sterling, it was considered to 
be internationally stable, as well. All this supported the fairly weak banking sec-
tor in its customer relations. Such customer relations were further strengthened 
by the extension of the Finance Institute Centre regarding the activities of com-
mercial banks related to deposits, pawnbrokerage, third-party guarantee, etc. The 
Finance Institute centre informed the National Bank of Hungary about its results 
on an annual basis.
The economic crisis of 1929–33 hit our country when agricultural production had 
already reached pre-war level, while industrial production even exceeded it by 
12% (Romsics, 1996). The crisis necessitated additional financial constraints and 
the extension of the functions of the Finance Institute Centre. As a result, state 
intervention was strengthened. Sándor Popovics, the Governor of the National 
Bank of Hungary, agreed to this policy, because the dominance of the state was 
common in international practice, as well. The National Bank of Hungary bought 
up the Hungarian Banknote Printing Plc. in 1925. The series production of 5-, 10-, 
20-, 50-, 100- and 1000-pengo banknotes already started in the Paper Factory of 
Diósgyőr in the same year. The banknotes were not only of excellent quality, but 
their artistic design was also exquisite by any international standards. Almost a 
year later, in 1926, the first metal 1-, 2-, 10-, 20- and 50-fillér coins, as well as the 
1-pengo gold coin were produced.10 The new means of payment were put in cir-
culation at the end of 1926 (officially on 1 January 1927). The withdrawal of crown 
banknotes started at the same time and finished by the middle of 1931.
10 The denomination composition did not change between 1931 and 1937. In terms of volume, the 
share of silver coins and change increased. As far as banknotes are concerned, the 1000-pengo 
denomination, which was issued in 1927, was withdrawn and the 10- and 50-pengo banknotes 
were replaced (Botos, 1999).
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The monetary stock of the domestic economy was continuously filling up to the 
required level, however, the process was interrupted by the outbreak of the eco-
nomic crisis in May 1929. The major, internationally dominant American banks 
suspended payments in gold. European central banks almost immediately fol-
lowed suit. European central banks covertly devalued their currencies. The Na-
tional Bank of Hungary had to take this measure, as well. The economic boom, 
which started so slowly earlier, came to an end. As a result, exchange control was 
reintroduced in the summer of 1931. 
As Lentner describes, the less hectic short consolidation period of the second half 
of the Horthy Era was interrupted by the so-called “Győri Plan” launched in 1938, 
with the aim of supporting preparation and armament for the new world war. 
The one billion pengos appropriated for the five-year period was a huge amount, 
which not only generated inflation, but also meant an unbearable burden for the 
country. In spite of the fact that orders by the armaments industry increased 
employment, their deflationary effect severely distorted incomes. Of course, the 
amounts spent on armament and the related infrastructural investments were 
completely lost due to the damage caused by the war. Based on estimates by ex-
perts, war damage amounted to 40% of national assets. In addition, about 1 mil-
lion people died, which resulted in obligations to pay compensation worth USD 
300 million. Private households, manufacturing industry, agriculture and trans-
portation suffered the most serious damage. Furthermore, the gold and foreign 
exchange stocks of the National Bank of Hungary were moved to the West.
4  THROUGH SOCIALIST PLANNED ECONOMY  
TO THE TRANSITION TO MARKET ECONOMY
The Provisional National Assembly set up at the end of December 1944 decided 
on the implementation of reconstruction, the land reform and nationalisations of 
smaller-scale, the reorganisation of economic life and public administration, as 
well as the soonest possible stoppage of inflation. 
According to the author, the reorganisation of the economy and public adminis-
tration started on the basis of the capitalist economy. Later, the victory of the left-
wing parties led to the introduction of a Soviet-type production method based 
on collective, public ownership. The most important tasks included ordering and 
implementing land distribution. In the framework of this, 5.6 million cadastral 
acres were distributed. According to the author, 70% of this land was given to 
farms servants and agricultural labourers, who had neither farming experience, 
nor the necessary equipment and tools. Later, this fact also contributed to the 
relatively smooth process of collectivisation. 
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The provisional government was replaced by a coalition government, whose priority 
was to create a stable national currency. In order to achieve this goal, preparations 
started at the end of 1945. In the framework of these preparations, the stockpiling of 
industrial and agriculture products was started for the date of stabilisation, which 
was to be announced later.11 The date of stabilisation depended primarily on the 
volume of consumer products and the return of the gold supply worth USD 32 mil-
lion, which was taken to the West by the Arrow Cross government. The favourable 
performance of agriculture in 1946 also influenced funds for commodities.
During the preparation for stabilisation, several proposals were made regarding 
the name of the currency. Finally, forint was selected, as it had already proven to 
be successful under the rule of Charles Robert, King Louis the Great, Rákóczi or 
Kossuth. Representing continuity, the name of the change remained fillér.12 The 
denomination composition of banknotes and coins was determined on the basis 
of the usual, traditional binary-decimal system. 2-, 10-, 20-fillér coins, 1-, 2-, 5-for-
int coins, as well as 10- and 100-forint banknotes were issued.13
Following stabilisation, the “socialist” economic system attempted to create op-
portunities for economic recovery after a successful historic step. Such attempts 
rather manifested themselves in “economic zigzags”. The global economic crises 
(over-production, oil price explosion, etc.) and the internal dissatisfaction (1956) 
added “fuel to the fire”. The stabilisation, which was regarded as successful, was 
followed by forced industrial development, with the aim of developing (recon-
structing) the economy according to plans. In reality, the underlying cause of 
industrial development was preparation for the cold war. The total monopolisa-
tion of the financial sector, the establishment of a one-tier banking system, the 
collectivisation of agriculture and the total transition to planned economy, etc. 
brought about a financial explosion which forced the government to adjust prices 
and wages in December 1951. As a result, the average price level increased by 40%, 
while the average wage level grew only by 20%. The purchasing power of the forint 
fell by 60% from the stabilisation value. For the sake of the intensive and one-
sided development of the socialist industry, the income due to the people was 
transferred to industry.
11 Already in March 1946, the National Bank of Hungary prepared an internal study on accession 
to the International Monetary Fund established in accordance with the Bretton-Woods Agree-
ment and to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the preparation of the 
membership application and the fulfilment of conditions (Huszti, 2016).
12 The monetary standard of forint equalled 0.0757 grams of fine gold, therefore the price of 1 kg 
was HUF 13,210. Based on gold parity, USD 1 was equivalent to HUF 11.74, while GBP 1 was worth 
HUF 29.35.
13 Because of the needs of cash flow, additional 20- and 50-forint banknotes were issued by 1951.
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They endeavoured to ease the untenable economic and political situation by 
means of various “market-strengthening reforms”, however, they were not able 
to suppress the dissatisfaction that lead to the outbreak of the revolution in 1956. 
Several new reform ideas were born in the aftermath of the revolution. They were 
realised slowly, but continuously: the role of central planning was decreased; cor-
porate independence increased; the prices of more products were adjusted to the 
demand; central wage regulation was replaced by corporate wage regulation.14
The 1970s can be regarded as the “period of international crises”. Hungary failed 
to react appropriately to soaring global market prices of energy sources and raw 
materials in 1973 and 1979, which had serious consequences, as our country was 
an “inward-looking” country.15 “... solvent demand had to be restricted, a new 
exchange rate policy had to be developed, Hungary had to join international or-
ganisations and accept the real purchasing power of domestic currency. Unfor-
tunately, they did not manage to develop functions which would have been suf-
ficiently appropriate export incentives, would have limited import or would have 
protected the domestic price level...” (Huszti, 2016:447).
The unsustainability of the reigning regime became clear not only to experts, but 
also to politicians. Different proposals were made to solve the situation. However, 
only the endeavours aimed to ensure external balance, “modernise” the system 
of planned economy and establish a two-tier banking system brought about real 
changes. Such endeavours generated a debate about the one- or two-tier bank-
ing systems, changing incomes, future of the market economy and adaptation to 
international crises, etc.16
The strict system of planned economy collapsed, the domestic economy depend-
ing on external markets was hit by global economic crises. It was becoming in-
creasingly obvious that the change of regime was inevitable. Of course, global 
economic processes, the weakening of the Soviet Union also contributed to these 
changes. “The Hungarian market economy was not established through the ex-
tension of internal resources increasing for decades, seeking to enterprise and 
looking for points to break out, but rather through the dynamic effects of western 
capital.”17
14 These ideas and processes already foreshadowed Hungary’s moving away from the traditional 
planning methods used by other socialist countries to some extent.
15 In international literature, the countries which failed to react to the signs of crisis were called 
“inward-looking”, while those which started adapting themselves to the changed international 
economic environment were called “outward-looking”.
16 The author follows and described the aforementioned processes in a very detailed manner.
17 A definition by Csaba Lentner.
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According to the author, in the new system defined as “social market economy”, 
the “more prudent and sophisticated introduction of a new, (raw) market-based 
economy” would have been more reasonable than the maintenance of state inter-
ventions. The mechanisms which were effective in the western world did not work 
well in Hungary’s “social market economy” due to the long-lasting transition, cap-
ital deficit, constant budgetary problems, etc. Accession to the EU brought about 
change, as Hungary had to establish an EU-compatible system of institutions, 
which increased the country’s economic responsibility, provided budget support, 
helped the establishment of democratic institutions, supported the development 
of the infrastructure and the countryside. At the same time, it also required some 
sacrifices owing to the abolition of previous market protection measures. On the 
other hand, export trade with countries in the EU and outside the EU is still well-
balanced and outstanding, even compared with other European countries.
The increase in the efficiency of the industrial sector was clearly due to privatisa-
tion and foreign direct investment, which ensured the consumption needs of the 
people, based on the western model and enabled the increase of employment. 
Not only did people expect more modern product supply, but they also expected 
a higher income level. According to experts, consumers, who were expressly im-
patient of their earlier helpless situation, were looking forward to have a higher 
standard of living and the opportunity to buy modern products. In order to re-
alise their dream, they needed appropriate salaries, a modern supply and income 
that allowed them to purchase consumer durables, as well.
The author subtly alludes to a lesser-known consequence of privatisation: “A kind 
of helplessness might have been one of the reasons why reigning governments 
forewent state assets and organised their privatisations. The governments were 
unable to finance sectors with obsolete production structure from budgetary 
resources.”18 Due to the lack or interest (and resources), “spontaneous privatisa-
tion helped only those who were in the immediate vicinity of the assets to acquire 
assets effectively.19 The government provided compensation notes for those who 
were entitled to receive compensation. However, owing to their old age and the 
value of the notes, most of these people used the compensation for non-business 
purposes and sold the notes. Consequently, nearly one-third of the entitled could 
18 In my opinion, it was a deliberate decision. If I wanted to travel, I would not get in a completely 
broken-down car, either.
19 Spontaneous privatisation was based on the rediscovery of Act XXXVII of 1875 and Act V of 1930, 
see: Sárközy (1993:123). 
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exchange the notes for assets, arable land and tenement flats let by local govern-
ments.20
In view of the above, taking into account the experience related to compensation 
notes, the author attributes the entitled nationals’ failure to acquire ownership to 
the following: a low-level of entrepreneurship; the lack of domestic resources; the 
tax system; the difficulties of marketing the products; uncertain access to loans; 
inadequate ability to advocate interests; etc.
The ownership structure of the agricultural sector was a bit more complicated 
than that of the industry or trade. On the other hand, agricultural output was 
easier to follow. Although the income of state farms and agricultural cooperatives 
was appropriate, agricultural prices were lagging behind raw material and indus-
trial prices affected by the oil crisis. The general cost increase and lower subsidies 
etc. led to unfavourable change in the price scissors of industrial and agricultural 
prices and decreased the agricultural sector’s potential to generate income. 
The author draws attention to a very important relationship: under political in-
fluence, almost 50% of the land acquired by means of compensation notes was 
divided into smallholdings of less than one hectare. Due to the lack of funding 
possibilities, they have not been cultivated properly, with modern technology over 
the past 50 years. The assets of cooperatives were distributed in an unprofessional 
way. The intentions of the members were ignored. Because of expected and real 
problems, the majority of the members of several cooperatives, mainly the elderly, 
would have wanted to maintain their security-providing membership in the co-
operative. By contrast, as the author claims, relations in the sector had become 
chaotic, the assets of the cooperatives accumulated over decades have practically 
come to nothing. As a result of the regime change that took place in agriculture, 
the structure of agricultural holding, efficiency and profitability all changed un-
favourably. Already at the time of the regime change, we had to take into account 
that our agricultural positions were unlikely to improve fast in the global market, 
therefore we had to prepare for the social consequences. Without considerable aids 
provided by the EU, the agricultural sector would not be able to operate, therefore, 
it is considered to be a “social sector”. However, the decreasing role of agriculture 
in the national economy is not only typical of EU member states, but its is also a 
global phenomenon, raising a lot of employment and social issues (Bod, 2018).
20 According to the author: “A great disadvantage of privatisation was that compensation note hold-
ers did not acquire decisive ownership share in most of the medium-sized food-manufacturing 
plants in their vicinity, as governments had not established the comprehensive economic condi-
tions of this step. Moreover, in the course of later operation, they did not provide overall support 
for the few plants where a domestic circle was able to acquire ownership share. 
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The author provides a detailed description of the situation of the banking sys-
tem, in particular that of the central bank, in relation to the transition to mar-
ket economy. Namely, the establishment of the two-tier banking system can be 
considered as a historic step regarding the domestic financial system as a whole. 
Beyond organisational changes, the importance of monetary regulation was ap-
preciated, the hierarchy and the system of relationships between the central bank 
and its clients (commercial banks) changed. This also altered previous relations 
between the budget and the central bank, as the credit system was not able to take 
over the share of corporate money demand that had to be financed from budget-
ary sources any longer. Financing losses, which were arising from widening in-
solvency, from loans was equivalent to quasi budgetary subsidies. Principally, the 
sectors most affected by the crisis were supported, as the government wanted to 
avoid more severe social consequences.
As the view according to which the funding problems of the domestic banking 
system can be solved by foreign owners was “officially” gaining ground, the priva-
tisation of banks occurred within a relatively short period of time. The main diffi-
culty was (and, in general, is) that financial institutions in foreign ownership had 
to fulfil the profit expectations of their owners. At the same time, the Hungarian 
financial government wanted financial institutions to contribute to the financing 
of economic growth with their instruments and meet the requirements set by the 
domestic central bank in terms of the regulation of solvent demand.
 Although Hungary was not an EU member state at the time, it adopted the EU’s 
directives on the central banks’ regulatory activity. Hungary did so in spite of the 
fact that the aforementioned directive still could not be harmonised with our na-
tional regulations and practice. Perhaps the most important rule forbade central 
banks to buy government securities upon issue so that they could “price” them 
based on primary demand. This was indicative of the state of the budget.
After the turn of the millennium, the Hungarian economy started growing, which 
could also be felt in the domestic banking sector. However, fiscal policy was still 
ailing, therefore real incomes grew more slowly than expected. As a result, the 
creditworthiness of people increased unrealistically but only latently. Neverthe-
less, it turned out only later, in connection with repayment obligations related to 
foreign currency lending. The situation was seemingly “beautiful and ideal”. At 
the same time, in reality, budgetary overspending and the indebtedness of several 
sates lay in the background. Unexpectedly, but necessarily, global bank failures 
drew attention to the debt crisis. It was appropriate to ask the following questions: 
What did governments do to ensure budget balance? What did central banks do 
to grant the stability of currencies? Regarding Hungary, these questions were es-
pecially relevant, as, because of our high budget deficit, the EU launched an ex-
cessive deficit procedure against our country in 2004. However, the result of the 
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fiscal restriction could not be assessed due to the economic crisis of 2007-2008, 
which profoundly affected our domestic economy, as well. The very unfavourable 
change in foreign exchange rates and interest rates of foreign loans was due to the 
unprofessional domestic use of foreign loans, while budget cuts and the loss of 
confidence in the financial sector resulted in considerable divestment of foreign 
capital. The effects of the aforementioned changes were felt for several years. As 
the author writes, on the brink of state bankruptcy, income owners had to bear a 
substantial part of burdens, therefore, as a matter of course, production was de-
creased, foreign trade deficit increased, subsidies were reduced and the situation 
of domestic income owners became unfavourable.
5 ACTIVE STATE MODEL – MORE ACTIVE FISCAL POLICY
Irrespective of differences in political and ideological views, it became clear that 
serious economic problems had to be solved in the decade following the crisis and 
they had to be addressed primarily in terms of economic policy. The two-thirds 
victory in the elections enabled the drafting of the Fundamental Law. After the 
adoption of the Fundamental Law, the Stability Act and the Act on the State Audit 
Office were ratified, the management of national assets was rationalised. Such ac-
tions allowed more scope to appropriately complete budgetary and control tasks. 
As the following threats were imminent: 
1) the collapse of the budget;
2) chronic deficit or perhaps collapse of the social security system, primarily that 
of the pension system;
3) bankruptcy of multiple companies, uncertain economic environment, 
reduced basic production functions;
4) bankruptcy of multiple local governments, social conflicts and public service 
dysfunctions;
5) the insolvency of families with foreign currency loans at a social level, the end 
of social stability and peace (Bethlendi–Lentner, 2018).
The author draws attention to those budgetary measures which facilitated the rea-
sonable change of tax structure and owing to which taxes on capital decreased 
and taxes on consumption increased (Varga, 2017a). The latter measure was not 
necessarily successful, as consumer prices were increasing faster than expected, 
which required higher-than-expected wage increase. This caused a big problem 
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especially in those sectors which were suffering from considerable staff shortage. 
Moreover, the impact of inflation could not be ignored, either.21
Regarding external debt, the situation was a bit uncertain, as no visible change 
occurred in the relations. Moreover, any negative change in the attitude of foreign 
investors could have caused tremendous imbalances. By involving unorthodox el-
ements in its toolkit, monetary policy helped to eliminate liquidity shortage. Zero 
or close-to-zero (but still positive) interest rates changed the relationship between 
clients and banks, as well as the usual relation between deposits and savings. 
The consequences of these phenomena are increasingly observable. The wrong 
decisions and attitude of financial institutions considerably decrease confidence 
in financial institutions, primarily among one of the most important group of 
money holders, the general public and small- and medium-sized enterprises. The 
consequences are unpredictable (Bod, 2019). As it is known, one example for these 
mismoves is the ordeal of Swiss-franc-denominated loans, another example is 
the threat posed by the huge volume of cash accumulated by the people. Both 
inspired a series of publications, however, no clear and effective solution has been 
found yet, regarding neither in lending, nor cash flow. The first topic causes dif-
ficulties for financial institutions using different registration methods, while the 
other generates lack of resources at financial institutions22, may upset retail de-
mand and supply balance and may lead to inflation psychosis.23
Several concerns may arise regarding the planned issue of government securities 
with a term of 4- or 5-year year maturity:
 − only a small part of the population will probably choose this form of saving, 
as they will rather keep their saving at home owing to unfavourable yields and 
lack of confidence;
 − if they do not trust in shorter-term government securities, why would they 
trust in government securities with half-decade-long maturity, considering 
that the yields are not too high after deducting the costs and taking into ac-
count cumulative price increase;24
 − considering the term, those who are good at finances prefer the stock market;
21 Varga (2017a; 2018) provided a detailed summary of the effects of inflation.
22 There are regular disagreements between clients and financial institutions on the actual and reg-
istered repayment terms.
23 It is difficult even for the state to find the measures by which the situation could be solved. For 
details see: Huszti (2018:441–453).
24 The financial government estimates that the average annual inflation will be 3% in the future, 
which generates a real yield that hardly exceeds zero.
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 − selling the government securities prior to the maturity date (because of illness, 
death, etc.) results in loss.
As the domestic fiscal policy has supported growth instead of taking auster-
ity measures, employment and the GDP have increased, external debt has de-
creased and the budgetary position of the country has improved. As a result, 
the government has been able to reduce public utility prices and increase family 
allowances, etc.
However, the improvement of the competitiveness of the economy requires the 
solution of further tasks, the most important of which are additional measures 
prioritising the continuous accumulation of savings and the increase of competi-
tiveness. In this respect, the government has not succeeded in achieving satis-
factory results yet. The institutional system supporting the achievement of the 
aforementioned goals has not been established yet. It will probably be set up in 
the 2020s.
This chapter provides abundant information on events after 2010 and is very use-
ful for researchers dealing with the topic. The presentation of the huge amount of 
knowledge is based on significant research work, as a result of which readers are 
guided from the global economic and debt crisis, through budgetary measures 
and the turn in the monetary policy of the central bank, to successful crisis man-
agement. According to the author, “After 2010, in the philosophy of economics 
and in specific measures, the improvement of social positions in the classic sense, 
such as the improvement of the demographic situation, the quality of the educa-
tion and healthcare systems, as well as the general improvement of the health and 
qualification of the labour force, appeared in - as it were - a direct way.25
It is particularly remarkable that the author aimed to present facts, allowing the 
reader to process and assess them. In one word, he did not force the reader to 
accept his opinion. This chapter provides the best opportunity to compare dif-
ferent views on fiscal and monetary policies and practice. The readers, who are 
supposed to be experts, as well, can decide whether they agree or disagree with 
the presented views. At the same time, it does not derogate the respectable en-
deavours of the author to provide extremely significant and comprehensive guid-
ance for researchers studying the individual topics by describing the findings of 
his research. 
The last chapter includes a theoretical and taxonomic summary by the Author 
and deals with the fiscal and monetary institutional system, practice and relation-
ship of the periods subject to the study. Although the Author did not intend to set 
25 Lentner (2019a: the final section of Chapter 6).
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up a hierarchy among the individual periods of economic history, his “favourite 
events” definitely took place during the dualism. This is probably linked to the 
fact that, in the views of some experts, Hungary became “quasi independent” in 
this period.
The author believes that the domestic financial system has three tiers:
 − the historical traditions of economic administration, the development of 
which accelerated in the period of dualism;
 − the fiscal and “unorthodox” practice of the central bank following the 
economic crisis of 2007–2008;
 − and market regulation expected from the state (forcing profit markers to show 
self-restraint).
The author thinks that total state intervention in economic governance and ex-
cessive autonomy provided for economic operators are equally detrimental. The 
former completely separates private enterprises from the economic-technolog-
ical base, while it has been proven that the latter leads to economic crisis. Of 
course, this does not rule out the market-leading role of state-owned companies 
in countries where they have traditionally been incorporated in the structure of 
the economy.26
In my view, the key questions are: Where should the economy be heading and 
with what kind of social and economic instruments? To what extent can the set of 
instruments supporting the state’s economic development activity be considered 
“ethical”? Where is the role of the state necessary or perhaps essential? When 
does it become unreasonable and oppressive for the economy? Who should bear 
the costs? How far can governments go regarding the centralisation of power? Al-
though the author is also right when raising the above-mentioned questions, no 
clear answers can be given to them based on the huge volume of literate reviewed 
and presented. Personally, I agree with the Author’s statement made in the first 
part of the work, according to which “centralisation is not a goal, but only an in-
strument in achieving consolidation.”
In view of the above, regarding the criteria of budgetary discipline, “a good tax 
system” and the central bank’s post-crisis policy, the author necessarily searches 
for an answer based on the experience collected in international literature and 
gained in the period of dualism.
In my opinion, knowledge related to the state and its economy strengthens the de-
termining character, significance of fiscal policy and the continuous control of its 
implementation. This idea became important already after the Austro-Hungarian 
26 See: Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, etc.
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Compromise of 1867. As the structure of the industry was weak, the agricultural 
sector had to bear the burden of developing the economy. This obligation was only 
strengthened by the global economic crisis of 1929-33, which totally weakened 
the already fragile domestic industry, resulting in unprecedented unemployment. 
Unfortunately, later, history repeated itself: the failed socialist industrialisation, 
the compulsory establishment of cooperatives and then their unwanted dissolu-
tion caused a lot of difficulties. Consequently, the structure of Hungarian agricul-
ture based on small, medium-sized and large estates still has not recovered to date 
due to uncertain ownership relations and a significant percentage of uncultivated 
lands, lagging a lot way behind its potential. Crises have always renewed financial 
culture. Historical experience gained from crises has had an important impact on 
Hungarian financial culture to date (Kovács–Terták, 2019).
Concerning “a good tax system or a good tax policy”, even contemporary authors 
raised the question: How far can taxation go, covering public expenses and with-
out crippling taxpayers? (Mariska, 1871) Government behaviour contrary to the 
idea above has a negative impact on the activity providing the tax bases, leads to 
social tensions not only towards the government, but also among certain groups 
of taxpayers. In the light of these considerations, the Author clearly states the fol-
lowing: “tax has to be adjusted to realistic taxability, having regard to the avoid-
ance of possible budgetary deficit.”
As Tamás Bánfi also puts it, the most important problems of modern economies 
include tax evasion, tax fraud, the success or failure of state regulation, the behav-
iour of taxpayers during and after the crisis, how optimal tax rates can be deter-
mined and how long fiscal pressure can be maintained, etc. (Bánfi, 2015). It is not 
only the author who searches for answers to these questions, but in the countries 
of the developed world, a lot of experts deal with researching the methods for 
whitening the economy. The underlying intention is that the successful whitening 
of the economy and increasing tax revenues enable the reduction of tax burdens. 
Otherwise, the consequences of the irritating black economy gain ground. Based 
on the above, the following statement by the Author can be accepted: “a good 
tax system exists only as a theoretical category.” In addition, under the influence 
of social changes, the tax system always has to face new challenges, reacting to 
which it is continuously changing (Varga–Cseh, 2019).
Subchapters 7.1 and 7.2 of the final chapter (Chapter 7) may mainly evoke the in-
terest of experts of the “history” of budget and they also contribute to deeper 
understanding of the previous chapters. The Author seems to have put a lot of 
energy into processing the relevant literature. Due to his efforts, I also had the 
opportunity to become familiar with some new sources. 
After the inevitable establishment of the two-tier banking system, it became clear 
soon that the functions of the central bank had to be changed, adjusting them to 
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the wider range of activities carried out by commercial banks, and in terms of the 
central bank’s relations to public finances, as well. Both fields required a more 
powerful central bank in supporting processes promoting macrostability and con-
trolling redistribution.27 Nevertheless, this can only be ensured if monetary and 
fiscal policies cooperate more closely. The central bank is responsible not only for 
setting “one-dimensional goals adjusted to inflation” prior to the crisis, but also 
for general macroeconomic and social stability.28 According to the author: “The 
redistributive effects of monetary policy have come to the foreground. The mod-
elling and transparency of the central bank’s decisions require the establishment 
of a framework that enables the interpretation and implementation of monetary 
policy decisions in a complex macroeconomic dimension and social context.29 In 
the light of the above, the Author agrees with those theoretical statements accord-
ing to which monetary policy can influence economic processes only in the short 
run. Only comprehensive countercyclical economic policy is suitable for this. 
This effect called “hysteresis phenomenon” “extraordinarily increases the value 
of countercyclical economic policy, as (...) it may only have a significant impact 
on the level of the GDP in the long run.”30 Economies kept under high demand 
pressure cannot grow unless they have free machinery and manpower available 
for expanding the supply. Otherwise, demand surplus will be “absorbed” by infla-
tionary price increase. We can agree with the author regarding that the aforemen-
tioned factors have to determine the future of fiscal and monetary policies. (Bánfi 
2019) The two large subsystems of financial policy, fiscal and monetary policies, 
have to operate in symbiosis for the sake of the competitiveness of the national 
economy, financial equilibrium and the success of possible crisis management, as 
well. Central bank mechanisms play an increasingly important role in it.
27 Kovács (2019:15) writes about the establishment of the two-tier banking system, the subsequent 
decades and the development of supervisory activity in detail. Monographs on the topic: Ko-
vács–Marsi (eds.) (2018:379).
28 About changes in banking policy after the crisis of 2007–2008, and the adaptation of the changes 
by Hungary, see: Kovács (2017:13). 
29 7.3.2 About the revival of institutional thinking and the appreciation of the role of the central bank. 
See the detailed description of new policies applied by central banks: Vonnák (ed.) (2017:496).
30 See: The Growth Report published by the National Bank of Hungary in December 2016.
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Ernő Huszti 90
The discursive essay is an expressive summary of the scientific life-
work of Ernő Huszti, who is about to celebrate his 90th birthday in 
2020, as well as that of the latest book by Csaba Lentner, his student. 
Ernő Huszti was the head of the Payment Department at the National 
Bank of Hungary. Later, he became one of the theoretical masterminds 
of the establishment of the two-tier banking system. In the early 1990s, 
he worked as the managing director of Magyar Hitelbank (Hungar-
ian Credit Bank), and then he became the Deputy CEO of Országos 
Kereskedelmi és Hitelbank (National Commercial and Credit Bank). 
He has been awarded the Silver Cross of Merit of the Hungarian Re-
public. His field of research: bank regulation, measurement of money 
demand and money supply, governance of monetary policy. He is an 
honorary university professor of Corvinus University of Budapest and 
the Budapest Business School. Until the mid-2000s, he taught at the 
University of Veszprém, the University of Sopron, Milton Friedman 
University. He has been an active member of the Public Finances Re-
search Group at the National University of Public Service for nearly 
ten years. He has been the author of a number of monographs, essays 
and other publications.
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